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Abstract
This Note argues that maintenance and cure is a right inherent in general admiralty law. As
such, it applies equally to unionized and non-unionized seamen, regardless of whether a bargainedfor rate of maintenance and cure exists. Part I traces the development of the doctrine of maintenance and cure. Part II presents and compares the courts’ positions on the assessment of maintenance and cure. Part III proposes that maintenance and cure is an admiralty right, implicit in
every seaman’s employment, which no contractual provision can abrogate. This Note concludes
that courts should decide each maintenance and cure case on an individual basis in order to ensure
that the rate awarded to the seaman reflects the actual costs incurred.

NOTES
RECOGNIZING MODERN MAINTENANCE AND CURE AS
AN ADMIRALTY RIGHT
INTRODUCTION
Since ancient times, seafaring nations have employed the
doctrine of maintenance and cure to provide room, board, and
medical care for injured seamen. 1 Maintenance and cure provided injured seamen with a per diem living allowance, paid to
the seaman by the shipowner, while the seaman recovered
ashore.2 The doctrine of maintenance and cure was based on
the belief that the vessel served as the seaman's home and the
seaman should be entitled to continue receiving lodging and
food even when sick.3 Traditionally, "maintenance" provided
1. See Laws of Ol1ron, reprinted in 30 F. Cas. 1171 [hereinafter Laws of Olron].
The twelfth century Laws of Ok6ron demonstrate how long maintenance and cure has
been part of admiralty law. See id. Article VI states that shipowners have no obligation to seamen whose own negligence caused the injuries. Id. art. VI, at 1174. If
injuries occur in the service of the ship, then the owner is liable. Id. Article VII sets
out the type of service to be rendered to the injured seaman. Id. art. VII, at 1174. It
noted that "the master ought to set him ashore, to provide lodging and candlelight
for him, and also to spare him one of the ship-boys ... and to afford him such diet as
... he had on shipboard in his health, and nothing more." Id.
Other ancient sea codes imitated the Laws of Ol~ron by disclaiming liability for
self-inflicted injuries but imposing liability, in the form of maintenance and cure, for
work-inflicted injuries. See The Laws of Wisbuy, arts. XVIII, XIX (1250), reprinted in
30 F. Cas. 1189, 1191; see also Sims, The American Law of Afaritime Personal Injury and
Death: An Historical Review, 55 TUL. L. REV. 973, 975 n.16 (1981) (containing additional sea codes).
2. See Pelotto v. L&N Towing Co., 604 F.2d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 1979) (noting that
maintenance and cure is per diem living and medical allowance paid while sailor "is
outside the hospital and has not reached the point of maximum cure"); see also
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 954 (6th ed. 1990). BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY defines maintenance and cure as a
[c]ontractual form of compensation given by general maritime law to seaman who falls ill while in service of his vessel. Seaman is entitled to maintenance and cure if he is injured or becomes ill in service [of) vessel, without
regard to negligence of his employer or to unseaworthiness of ship; and
"maintenance" is a per diem living allowance for food and lodging and
"cure" is payment for medical, therapeutic and hospital expenses; and employer's duty to pay maintenance and cure continues until seaman has
reached "maximum cure."
Id.
3. See Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 732 (1943). Justice Rutledge,
writing for the Court, stated that "during the period of [the seaman's] tenure the
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for the cost of obtaining food and lodging comparable to that
which the seaman received at sea.4 "Cure" provided for payment of medical expenses incurred in the treatment of the sea-

man's injury or illness. 5 Courts historically granted the remedy regardless of the seaman's employment contract.6
In the late 1940s and early 1950s, U.S. admiralty unions
incorporated maintenance and cure into contracts between unionized seamen and shipowners. 7 Unions negotiated fixed
rates of maintenance and cure for seamen, rather than retaining the traditional remedy of awarding them the expenses actually incurred. 8 Unions set the rate of maintenance and cure
at US$8.00, an appropriate rate in the 1950s, but one which no
longer suffices.9 Since then, U.S. courts have split on whether
vessel is not merely his place of employment; it is the framework of his existence. For
that reason, among others, his employer's responsibility for maintenance and cure
extends beyond injuries sustained because of, or while engaged in, activities required
by his employment." Id.
4. Morel v. Sabine Towing & Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 345, 346 (5th Cir. 1982)
(defining maintenance as "equivalent of the food and lodging to which a seaman is
entitled while at sea"); see supra note 2 (defining maintenance and cure).
5. Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 528 (1938). In Calmar, the U.S.
Supreme Court defined cure as "care, including nursing and medical attention during such period as the duty continues." Id. The duty to provide cure continued until
seaman reached "maximum cure," meaning until the seaman was cured or diagnosed
as permanently incurable. Vella v. Ford Motor Co., 421 U.S. 1, 5 (1975); see BLACK's
LAW DICTIONARY 381 (6th ed. 1990) (quoting Calmar definition for cure).
Cure provided medical care for injured seamen. See Calmar, 303 U.S. at 528.
Presently some unions bargain for medical benefits in the form of disability pensions
and sick leave for their members. See generally Flaherty, The Effect of Inflation on
Seamen's MaintenanceAwards, 22 S. TEx. LJ. 533, 541 (1982). In those contracts, the
pensions and sick leave benefits are supposed to supplement the traditional cure provided to seamen. Id.
6. See, e.g., Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367, 372 (1932); Barnes v.
Andover Co., L.P., 900 F.2d 630, 640 (3d Cir. 1990).
7. See Rutherford v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1365, 1370 (N.D. Cal.
1983). The court granted a unionized sailor, assaulted by a fellow crew member, an
increase in the contracted rate of maintenance and cure. Id. at 1370. The Rutherford
court noted that "[w]ith the advent of collective bargaining agreements in the 1960's,
the union and the shipowners made the rate of maintenance a subject of negotiation,
and uniformly adopted the US $8.00 figure as the daily rate of maintenance." Id.; see
G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 6-12, at 307 (2d ed. 1975) (stating
that US$8.00 became accepted maintenance and cure rate after 1950s); Note, Strict
Enforcement of Collectively BargainedMaintenance Rates: Gardiner v. Sea-Land Service,
Inc., 11 MAR. LAw. 311, 313-14 (1986) (noting Rutherford court's statement of incorporation of maintenance and cure into marine employment contracts).
8. See Rutherford, 575 F. Supp. at 1370.
9. See infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text (discussing how US$8.00 per
day is no longer sufficient to support injured seamen).
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to bind unionized seamen to the unions' contractual rates
when those rates prove inadequate, or to allow the seamen to
recover their actual costs.' 0
This Note argues that maintenance and cure is a right inherent in general admiralty law. As such, it applies equally to
unionized and non-unionized seamen, regardless of whether a
bargained-for rate of maintenance and cure exists. Part I
traces the development of the doctrine of maintenance and
cure. Part II presents and compares the courts' positions on
the assessment of maintenance and cure. Part III proposes
that maintenance and cure is an admiralty right, implicit in
every seaman's employment, which no contractual provision
can abrogate. This Note concludes that courts should decide

each maintenance and cure case on an individual basis in order
to ensure that the rate awarded to the seaman reflects the actual costs incurred.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE MAINTENANCE
AND CURE DOCTRINE
Admiralty law regulates all aspects of shipping." It protects shipowners and cargo owners from losses of vessels and
cargo.12 In addition, admiralty law protects seamen from the
10. Compare Gardiner v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 786 F.2d 943 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 924 (1986) (binding unionized sailor to contractual rate of maintenance and
cure) with Barnes, 900 F.2d 630 (awarding unionized sailor rate of maintenance and
cure in excess of collectively bargained-for rate).
11. See DeLovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 3776) (presenting overview of U.S. admiralty jurisdiction).
12. See, e.g., Laws of Wisbuy, supra note 1, at 1191. Article XXII of the Laws of
Wisbuy provided protection for both shipowners and cargo owners by stating that
[t]he master and mariners are obliged to shew the merchant the cordage
that is used for hoisting his goods in and out of the ship; if he does not do it,
and there happens any accident, they shall stand to the loss; but if the
merchant has seen and approved of it, the damage he sustains shall be
borne by himself.
Id.; interview with Joseph C. Sweeney, Professor of Law, Fordham University School
of Law (Sept. 10, 1990). Professor Sweeney noted that, in the Sea Codes of Barcelona, estimated to have originated in the thirteenth century, a shipowner was required to have a cat on board the vessel to protect grain cargo against damage from
mice. Id. If no cat was on board and the grain was damaged, the shipowner was
liable to the cargo owner. Id. If, however, a cat was present at the inception of the
voyage but died before reaching the final port and the grain was damaged, the shipowner had no liability for the damage. Id.
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severity of seafaring life. i Maintenance and cure is one aspect
of admiralty law that protects seamen. The doctrine of maintenance and cure has been part of British admiralty law since
1150 when Eleanor of Guienne brought France's sea codes,
the Laws of Ol1ron, to England. 1 4 The Laws of Oleron addressed every facet of admiralty voyages, from obtaining vessels to crew requirements, and were cited as authority in the
admiralty courts of England.' 5 During his reign, King Richard
recogI of England adopted the Laws of Olron and formally
16
nized the seaman's right to maintenance and cure.
In the United States, admiralty law originated from English common law.' 17 Until the end of the American Revolution
in 1783, most courts in the American colonies adopted English
law, including English admiralty law. To facilitate the hearing
of admiralty cases, Courts of the Vice Admiralty were established by the crown in leading ports. 18 After the American
Revolution, however, U.S. federal district courts began to fashion their own maintenance and cure laws separate from those
of England.' 9 The U.S. courts based their maintenance and
cure laws on the established principle that a seaman, injured in
the service of the ship, received maintenance and cure at the
expense of the ship."0
The maintenance and cure doctrine developed in U.S.
courts to shield seamen from the severity of the seafaring
life. 2 ' Justice Story was first to recognize formally the doctrine
of maintenance and cure in the United States.2 2 Justice Story
13. See Laws of Hanse Towns, art. XXXV, reprinted in 30 F. Cas. 1197, 1199 (providing lifetime maintenance and cure for seamen maimed or disabled while defending vessel against pirates).
14. See Laws of Olron, supra note 1, arts. VI & VII, at 1174-75.
15. See id. at 1171.
16. See 2 M. NORRIS, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 26:3 n.6 (4th ed. 1985). King Edward III gave the Laws of Olron ultimate confirmation in 1339. See id.
17. See generally Sims, supra note 1, at 973 n.1. Sims states that maintenance and
cure is the oldest branch of maritime personal injury law in the United States because
U.S. courts incorporated British maintenance and cure into admiralty law. Id.
18. See THE CONCISE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA 26 (1983) (describing American
Revolution); Sims, supra note 1, at 973 n. 1 (stating that colonists ceased applying new
British laws after the American Revolution).
19. See Sims, supra note 1, at 973 n.l.
20. See Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 482 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (No. 6,047); see
also Sims, supra note 1, at 978.
21. See Harden, 11 F. Cas. at 482-83.
22. See id. at 483 (Story, J.); see also Barnes v. Andover, 900 F.2d 630, 633 (3d.
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argued that because the admiralty laws in Europe consistently
recognized maintenance and cure as an admiralty right,"5 the
United States should also adopt the doctrine. 4
Justice Story saw seamen as "wards of the admiralty," 25
depicting them as poor and friendless individuals who suffered
under harsh and dangerous living conditions.2 6 As a consequence of the severe conditions of the seafaring life, Justice
Story declared that seamen needed the protection of maintenance and cure.27 Fearing that shipowners would try to take
advantage of seamen's inexperience and coerce them to sign
unfavorable contracts, Justice Story reasoned that seamen
needed courts to act as their guardians against shipowners.2
Cir 1990) (noting that "duty to provide maintenance and cure was first introduced
into American admiralty law by Justice Story"); Note, Maintenance and Cure: Contract
Right or Legal Obligation?, 62 TUL. L. REV. 625, 625 n.2 (1988) (noting that Justice
Story was first to formally recognize maintenance and cure in United States).
23. Harden, 11 F. Cas. at 482. Justice Story stated that
I have not been able to detect a single instance, in which the maritime laws
of any foreign country throw upon seamen disabled or taken sick .

.

. the

expenses of their cure. On the contrary, these positive ordinances of the
principal maritime nations expressly make these expenses a charge upon the
ship.
Id.
24. Id. at 483. Justice Story declared that, "[iut would therefore be [a] matter of
regret to find incorporated into the common law a doctrine at variance with that,
which seems so generally to have received the approbation of continental Europe."
Id.
25. Courts that view seamen as "wards of the admiralty" consider seamen incapable of caring for themselves. Id. at 483 & 485; see M. NORRIS, supra note 16, at
§ 26:9 (tracing U.S. adoption of maintenance and cure based on "wards" theory);
infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text (defining "wards of the admiralty").
26. Harden v. Gordon, 11 F. Cas. 480, 483 (C.C.D. Me. 1823) (No. 6,047). Justice Story characterized seamen as being "by the peculiarity of their lives liable to
sudden sickness from change of climate, exposure to perils, and exhausting labour.
They are generally poor and friendless, and acquire habits of gross indulgence, carelessness, and improvidence." Id.
27. Id. at 485. Justice Story stated that because seamen are naive and friendless,
they require extra protection. Id. In another case, he stated that
[iun a just sense [seamen are considered wards of the admiralty], so far as
the maintenance of their rights, and the protection of their interests against
the effects of the superior skill and shrewdness of masters and owners of
ships are concerned.
Brown v. Lull, 4 F. Cas. 407, 409 (C.C.D. Mass. 1836) (No. 2,018).
28. See Brown, 4 F. Cas. at 409. Justice Story stated that
courts of admiralty are in the habit of watching with scrupulous jealousy
every deviation from [the rights of seamen] in the [sailor's employment contract], as injurious to the rights of seamen, and founded in an unconscionable inequality of benefits between the parties ....
Seamen are a class of
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Justice Story supported the granting of maintenance and cure

by explaining that a seaman's pay alone was usually insufficient
to meet the expenses of illness.2 9 Without monetary aid from
shipowners, Justice Story suggested, seamen faced hardship or
even death, particularly when their illness caused them to be
discharged in a foreign port.3 °
Justice Story found that certain benefits arose to both
shipowners and seamen from holding shipowners liable for
their employees' welfare . 3 First, requiring shipowners to bear
the expenses of maintenance and cure would encourage them
to provide safer working environments, thereby reducing the
number of accidents. 2 The diminished number of accidents
would decrease the number of seamen requesting maintenance
and cure, and the shipowner would therefore expend less
money on maintenance and cure payments.3 3 Second, providing maintenance and cure constitutes good public policy because, if seamen know that the shipowner will pay for workrelated injuries, the seamen may more willingly enter the pro34
fession and face the dangerous tasks inherent in seafaring.
persons remarkable for their rashness, thoughtlessness and improvidence ....

Hence it is, that bargains between them and shipowners, the

latter being persons of great intelligence and shrewdness in business, are
deemed open to much observation and scrutiny; for they involve great inequality of knowledge, of forecast, of power, and of condition.
Id
29. Harden, 11 F. Cas. at 483.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. Justice Story explained the benefit to seamen as being that
[t]he master will watch over [the seamen's] health with vigilance and fidelity.
He will take the best methods, as well to prevent diseases, as to ensure a
speedy recovery from them. He will never be tempted to abandon the sick
to their forlorn fate; but his duty, combining with the interest of his owner,
will lead him to succor their distress, and shed a cheering kindness over the
anxious hours of suffering and despondency.
Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. Justice Story explained that there was a
great public policy of preserving this important class of citizens for the commercial service and maritime defence of the nation. Every act of legislation
which secures their healths, increases their comforts, and administers to
their infirmities, binds them more strongly to their country; and the parental
law, which relieves them in sickness by fastening their interests to the ship, is
as wise in policy, as it is just in obligation ....
It encourages seamen to
engage in perilous voyages with more promptitude, and at lower wages...
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Based on Justice Story's description of seamen as
"wards," the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently expanded
maintenance and cure rights. 35 For example, ancient sea codes
required that the injury occur while seamen were in the service
of the ship. 6 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, broadened
the availability of maintenance and cure to include situations in
37
which the seaman received injuries while on shore.
Gradually, conflict arose over whether maintenance and
cure applied when the seaman was contributorily negligent.3 8
Historically, negligence by a seaman prevented an award of

maintenance and cure.

9

Subsequently, some U.S. courts be-

and urges the seamen to encounter hazards in the ship's service, from which
they might otherwise be disposed to withdraw.
Id.

35. See Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 19 (1963) (noting that
maintenance and cure cannot be reduced even if seaman was contributorily negligent); Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523, 529 (1951) (expanding maintenance
and cure to include injuries caused by seaman's own negligence while on shore
leave); Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 736-37 (1943) (holding shipowner
liable for injuries sustained during seaman's shore leave as long as seaman did not
engage in gross misconduct).
36. One court conferred seaman status upon any individual who was, at the time
of the injury or illness, "subject to the call of duty as a seaman, and earning wages as
such." The Bouker No. 2, 241 F. 831, 833 (2d Cir. 1917). A commentator narrowed
the definition to "[alnyone who is a member of the ship's company." Shields,
Seamen's Rights To Recover Maintenance and Cure Benefits, 55 TUL. L. REV. 1046, 1048

(1981). This clarification distinguished seamen from the other workers who render
services to the vessel and might make a claim for maintenance (i.e., harbor workers
and offshore workers). Flaherty, supra note 5, at 533. In 1972 Congress amended the
Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (the "LHWCA") to exclude harbor workers from receiving maintenance and cure. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1988).
The U.S. Supreme Court extended the scope of LHWCA to include offshore workers. See Herb's Welding, Inc. v. Gray, 470 U.S. 414 (1985); see also Laws of Olron,
supra note 1, art. VI, at 1174 (requiring injury to occur in service of ship).
37. See O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 38 (1943)
(stating that going ashore to repair conduit through which vessel discharges cargo
would not preclude recovery of maintenance and cure). The extension of maintenance and cure has also been construed to include accidents on land while on shore
leave. See Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523, 530 (1951). In Warren, a seaman at
a dance hall in Italy drank a bottle of wine and fell off the balcony, Id. at 524. The
Court awarded maintenance and cure because "it is the ship's business which subjects the seaman to the risks attending hours of relaxation in strange surroundings.
Accordingly, it is but reasonable that the business extend the same protections
against injury from them as it gives for other risks of the employment." Id. at 530.
38. See generally Bailey, Willful Misconduct in Maintenance and Cure Cases, 24 S. TEx.

LJ. 629, 631 (1983).
39. Laws of Olron, supra note 1, art. VI, at 1174. Article VI precluded receipt
of maintenance and cure if the sailor was in any way contributorily negligent. Id.
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gan to award maintenance and cure to injured seamen regardless of fault, holding that only a seaman's willful misconduct
would prevent an award of maintenance and cure.40
In an attempt to clarify the liability of shipowners for their
seamen's injuries, U.S. delegates attended the International

Labor Organization conference in Geneva in 1936. 4 1 Delegates from several countries met at the conference to discuss
the possibility of an international agreement regulating shipowners' liability to their seamen. 42 These conference participants drafted a proposed convention, which the U.S. delegates
subsequently submitted to Congress. 43 The U.S. Senate ratified the Shipowners' Liability Convention (the "Convention"),
and President Franklin D. Roosevelt proclaimed that it would
take effect in the United States on October 29, 1939. 4 4
Some courts have used this Convention to assert statutory
support for the position that maintenance and cure is an admiralty right. 4 5 Article 2 of the Convention made shipowners lia40. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 735-36 (1943). In Aguilar, the Court awarded maintenance and cure to a seaman who was hit by car while
returning to his vessel from shore leave. Id.; see Bailey, supra note 39, at 633 n.27 &
635-43 (noting that venereal disease, habitual intoxication, and deliberate disobedience of orders were examples of willful misconduct). Bailey argues that courts have
eroded these maintenance and cure defenses in attempts to protect seamen. Id.; see
M. NORRIS, supra note 16, at § 26:14 (noting that contributory negligence does not
bar maintenance and cure recovery).
The erosion of shipowners' maintenance and cure defenses have made "maintenance and cure... available to seamen who in their efforts to entertain themselves in
a fashion commensurate with others of their calling become injured or ill. The personal nature of the seamen's activity is of no consequence in assessing their claim for
recovery." Shields, supra note 37, at 1051; see 2 A. PARKS, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF
MARINE INSURANCE AND AVERAGE 845-57 (1987) (giving overview of maintenance and
cure, defenses of shipowner, and possible additional causes of action for seaman);

Buser, Seamen's Right to Maintenanceand Cure after Refusal of Free Medical Care, 22 S. TEx.
L.J. 587, 588 n. 1 (1982) (stating seaman will not recover if injury was intentionally
concealed by seaman at inception of employment, or injury was incurred as result of
willful behavior).
41. See Shipowners' Liability Convention, 54 Stat. 1693 (1936); see also Farrell v.
United States, 336 U.S. 511, 517 (1949) (discussing beginnings of Shipowners' Liability Convention).
42. See Farrell, 336 U.S. at 517.
43. See id.
44. See Shipowners' Liability Convention, 54 Stat. at 1704.
45. See, e.g., O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 42
(1943) (stating that Shipowners' Liability Convention confirmed admiralty law procedure which historically provided maintenance and cure to seamen injured while in
service of ship).

1990-1991]

MAINTENANCE AND CURE

677

ble for a seaman's illness and injury, provided that the injury
occurred during the employment period, and as long as the
seaman did not engage in willful misconduct.46 The U.S.
Supreme Court held on several occasions that the Convention
reinforced the traditional admiralty right of maintenance and
cure.4" Although the Convention adopted a statutory framework for seamen's misconduct, the Supreme Court held that
the Convention did not preempt the general admiralty law
rights of seamen. 48 This holding was consistent with article 12
of the Convention, which stated that the Convention would not
affect any national law that granted a more favorable result for
the seaman.4 9
II. OPPOSITION IN THE COURTS: "ADMIRALTY RIGHT"
VERSUS "CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION"
U.S. courts generally accept Justice Story's rationale for
the need for maintenance and cure. 50 Most U.S. courts of ap46. Shipowners' Liability Convention, art. 2, 54 Stat. 1693, 1695 (1936).
47. See Vella v. Ford Motor Co., 421 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1975); Warren v. United States,
340 U.S. 523, 527 (1951); Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 517-19 (1949);
O'Donnell, 318 U.S. at 41-42 (1943).
48. Warren, 340 U.S. at 527. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, stated that
[w]e find no suggestion that [the Convention] was designed to adopt a more
strict standard of liability than that which our maritime law provides. The
aim indeed was not to change materially American standards but to equalize
operating costs by raising the standards of member nations to the American
level.
Id. See generally Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to a Seaman's Right, under Maritime
Law, to Maintenance and Cure, 43 L. Ed. 2d 912, 918-19 (1975) (stating that U.S.
Supreme Court discussed convention only to state that it did not restrict maritime
rights to maintenance and cure).
49. Shipowners' Liability Convention, 54 Stat. 1693, 1700 (1936); see O'Donnell,
318 U.S. at 42 (stating that article 12 of Convention permits United States to follow
its own laws that are more favorable to seamen); M. NORRIS, supra note 16, at § 26:68
(discussing Convention); see also Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 729
(1943) (interpreting several statutes liberally in favor of seamen). Although articles 2
and 4 discuss shipowners' liability, article 12 effectively advances the "admiralty
right" theory because it reinforces the position that shipowners' liability for maintenance and cure is implicit in contracts of marine employment and is not predicated
on any fault or negligence of shipowners. See Shipowners' Liability Convention, 54
Stat. 1693, 1700.
50. See Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 531 (1962) (referring to Justice
Story's classic depiction of friendless seamen); see also Farrell, 336 U.S. at 523; Aguilar,
318 U.S. at 728 n.2; Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 528 (1938); The
Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 172 (1903); Barnes v. Andover Co., L.P., 900 F.2d 630, 633 (3d
Cir. 1990); Gardiner v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 786 F.2d 943, 946 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
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peals recognize maintenance and cure as an important part of
admiralty law.5" U.S. courts disagree, however, whether maintenance and cure should be enforced as a contract provision 5 2
instead of as a general admiralty law obligation under the spe53
cial circumstances of a collectively bargained agreement.
The core of the dissension over "admiralty right" or "contractual obligation" maintenance and cure lies in which interpreta54
tion to apply to unionized seamen.
A. Maintenance and Cure as an "Admiralty Right"
Some of the earliest U.S. admiralty decisions identified
maintenance and cure as an admiralty right.5 5 The rationale of
479 U.S. 924 (1986); Morel v. Sabine Towing & Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 345, 346 (5th
Cir. 1982); Wood v. Diamond M Drilling Co., 691 F.2d 1165, 1170 (5th Cir. 1982);
Incandela v. American Dredging Co., 659 F.2d 11, 13-14 (2d Cir. 1981); Cox v.
Dravo Corp., 517 F.2d 620, 623 (3d Cir. 1975); Rutherford v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc.,
575 F. Supp. 1365, 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
51. See Barnes, 900 F.2d 630; Macedo v. F/V Paul & Michelle, 868 F.2d 519 (1st
Cir. 1989); Hines v.J.A. Laporte, Inc., 820 F.2d 1187 (11th Cir. 1987); Gardiner, 786
F.2d 943; Wood, 691 F.2d 1165; Incandela, 659 F.2d 11; Evans v. Blidberg Rothchild
Co., 382 F.2d 637 (4th Cir. 1967).
52. See, e.g., Grove v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 777, 781 (E.D. La. 1982)
(holding that if there is provision in contract dealing with maintenance and cure, then
it must be enforced). The court explained its position by stating that
where the seaman, through the Union as his representative, expressly contracts with his employer for a specific rate of maintenance, whether it be
higher or lower than it would otherwise be, the contract between the seaman and his employer establishes, as a matter of law, the rate of maintenance to be paid.
Id. at 780.
53. See, e.g., Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1932)
(holding that maintenance and cure, as common law right, can go to decedent-seaman's personal representative under Jones Act). Justice Cardozo stated that
[clontractual [maintenance and cure] is in the sense that it has its source in a
relation which is contractual in origin, but given the relation, no agreement
is competent to abrogate the incident.... The duty.., is one annexed by
law to a relation, and annexed as an inseparable incident without heed to
any expression of the will of the contracting parties.
Id.
54. See, e.g., Gardiner, 786 F.2d at 949. The question applies solely to unionized
seamen because all circuits which have ruled on this issue are in agreement that nonunionized seamen should not be held to a contract in which they have had no part.
See Incandela, 659 F.2d at 14; Caulfield v. AC&D Marine, Inc., 633 F.2d 1129, 1132
(5th Cir. 1981); Harper v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 563 F. Supp. 576, 583-84 (E.D. La.
1983); Gauthier v. Crosby Marine Serv., Inc., 499 F. Supp. 295, 299 (E.D. La. 1980);
Robinson v. Plimsoll Marine, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 949, 950 (E.D. La. 1978).
55. See, e.g., The Bouker No. 2, 241 F. 831 (2d Cir. 1917). The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that "[b]y the custom of the sea the hiring of
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these decisions focused on the traditional concept of maintenance and cure as an admiralty right,5 6 as well as the notion
that seamen's ignorance and naivete necessitated additional
protection from the courts.5 7 Affirming the protection of the
courts, the U.S. Senate, in 1939, recognized the general admiralty law right to maintenance and cure when it ratified the
Shipowners' Liability Convention."
Moreover, many U.S.
courts have consistently distinguished maintenance and cure
from ordinary contractual rights.5 9

For nearly 150 years, U.S. courts saw maintenance and
cure as an unassailable obligation inherent in every seaman's
employment. 60 Courts did not view the doctrine as a custom
opL n to modification or abrogation by practice or agreement.6 '
Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the right to
maintenance and cure must be broadly interpreted in the seaman's favor.6 2 Indeed, according to the Supreme Court, mainsailors has for centuries included food and lodging at the expense of the ship." Id. at
835.
56. See Barnes v. Andover Co., L.P., 900 F.2d 630, 633 (3d Cir. 1990) (attributing rise of maintenance and cure to ancient admiralty codes); supra note 1 and accompanying text (describing how duty to provide maintenance and cure arose in medieval sea codes).
57. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text (illustrating doctrine of seamen
as "wards of the admiralty" needing courts' protection from shipowners).
58. Shipowners' Liability Convention, 54 Stat. 1693 (1936); see Barnes, 900 F,2d
at 634 (detailing 1936 U.S. Senate ratification of Shipowners' Liability Convention
and President Franklin D. Roosevelt's proclamation of its commencement on October 29, 1939); Annotation, supra note 41 (explaining why several courts disregard
Convention).
59. See, e.g., Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527, 532 (1962) (distinguishing
maintenance and cure as admiralty right from contract rights and obligations); Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1932) (noting that admiralty law
imposes duty to provide maintenance and cure on shipowners regardless of their
desires or any contracts signed).
60. Pelotto v. L&N Towing Co', 604 F.2d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 1979). The court
stated that a "seaman's right to maintenance and cure is implicit in the contractual
relationship between the seaman and his employer, and is designed to ensure the
recovery of these individuals upon injury or sickness sustained in the service of the
ship." Id.; see Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 528 (1938) (holding that maintenance and cure is implicit in employment contract). Several commentators concur
with the courts. See, e.g., Shields, supra note 36, at 1046-47. The author states that
"[m]aintenance and cure today is fully recognized and implemented as an implied
provision in contracts of marine employment." Id.; I B BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 51
(7th ed. 1990) [hereinafter BENEDICT]; M. NORRIS, supra note 16, at § 26:2; Sims,
supra note 1, at 978.
61. See, e.g., Cortes, 287 U.S. at 371-72.
62. See Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 735 (1943). The Supreme
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tenance and cure is a right imposed by law, and the shipowner
cannot contract with an individual seaman to abrogate or do
away with it in the way that contractual rights can be negoti6
ated away. 3
A number of U.S. courts of appeals today separate maintenance and cure from contract provisions. 64 Most recently, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit decided the case of
Barnes v. Andover Company, L.P. 65 In Barnes, the court awarded a

unionized seaman a rate of maintenance and cure in excess of
the contractually

assigned

rate.66

The

plaintiff, George

Court stated that the nature of the liability required that it not be restrictively applied
or else the benefits of maintenance and cure protection would be defeated. Id. 'The
Court continued by noting that "[i]f leeway is to be given in either direction, all the
considerations which brought the liability into being dictate it should be in the
sailor's behalf." Id.
63. See De Zon v. American President Lines, Ltd., 318 U.S. 660, 667 (1943).
Justice Jackson opined that
[w]hen the seaman becomes committed to the service of the ship, the maritime law annexes a duty that no private agreement is competent to abrogate,
and the ship is committed to the maintenance and cure of the seaman for
illness or injury during the period of the voyage, and in some cases for a
period thereafter. This duty does not depend upon fault.
Id. (citations omitted); see Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367, 371 (1932);
Barnes v. Andover Co., L.P., 900 F.2d 630, 637 (3d Cir. 1990); Dryden v. Ocean
Accident & Guarantee Corp., 138 F.2d 291, 293 (7th Cir. 1943). "Admiralty right"
proponents agree that
concededly an employee-employer relationship is a contractual one. Probably many of the details of that relationship-wages, hours, etc., are fixed by
specific contract provisions and are express contractual rights. But the right
here sought to be enforced [maintenance and cure] by the seaman was not
founded on a "meeting of the minds"-it was inexorably attached by ancient and established maritime law to every seaman's contract of employment. The parties had no choice in the matter. It was a duty superimposed
by law coincidental with the formation of the contractual relation. The seaman could not contract against it- his or his employer's will is powerless to
destroy it. This aspect alone reflects the true nature of the right here sought
to be enforced. It is a right which the maritime law, in the wisdom of experience, found necessary and just, for the complete protection of seamen,
whom maritime law has treated as "wards of admiralty."
Dryden, 138 F.2d at 293 (emphasis in original).
64. E.g., Barnes, 900 F.2d at 637 (stating that, while contracts can be modified,
maintenance and cure cannot).
65. 900 F.2d 630 (3d Cir. 1990).
66. Id. at 640. Most courts permit only non-unionized seamen to recover maintenance and cure above the rate provided for in the contract, because they were not a
part of that contract. See, e.g., Harper v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 563 F. Supp. 576
(E.D. La. 1983); see also supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing non-unionized seamen's awards).
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Barnes, a member of the Seafarers International Union, sustained a work-related injury. 67 Barnes sued the shipowner-defendant, alleging that the defendant's negligence and the unseaworthiness of the vessel caused his injuries.68 Barnes requested US$35.00 per day for maintenance and cure, a sum in
excess of the US$8.00 per day set in the collective bargaining
agreement between the Seafarers International Union and the
defendant. 69 The defendant argued that the National Labor
Relations Act (the "NLRA") 7 ° preempted the seaman's right to
claim maintenance above the contractual rate. 7 ' The court rejected the defendant's claim and ruled that the plaintiff, a unionized seaman, was entitled to more maintenance and cure
than the collective bargaining agreement provided.72 The
Barnes court found that maintenance and cure fell outside the
scope of collective bargaining 73 because, as a traditional right
inherent in admiralty law, it could not be abrogated by contractual negotiations. 4
The Barnes court then cited the U.S. Supreme Court's continuous expansion of seamen's rights as reason to enforce the
traditional "admiralty right" position.75 While noting that the
plight of the seaman was not as dreadful as in Justice Story's
time, the Third Circuit stated that the U.S. Supreme Court has
indicated no recent inclination to modify the well-established
doctrine of seamen as "wards of the admiralty." '7 6 The Third

Circuit, therefore, would also continue to consider seamen as
"wards" entitled to maintenance and cure.7 7
67. Barnes, 900 F.2d at 632.
68. Id.
69. Id. Plaintiff also made claims for compensatory and punitive damages but
those were settled, thus leaving only the maintenance and cure issue for the court.
Id.
70. 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(d), 159(a) & 185(a) (1988).
71. Barnes v. Andover Co., 900 F.2d 630, 637-39 (3d Cir. 1990).
72. Id. at 640.
73. Id.

74. Barnes, 900 F.2d at 635; see supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing
Cardozo's holding that right to maintenance and cure is implicit in very fact of employment, not in employment contract).
75. Barnes, 900 F.2d at 637.
76. Id. The court demonstrated the Supreme Court's continued espousal of the
seaman as a ward of the admiralty as late as 1976. Id.; see Oil, Chemical & Atomic
Workers Int'l Union v. Mobil Oil Co., 426 U.S. 407, 421 (1976) (holding, most recently, that seamen are still "wards").
77. Barnes v. Andover Co., 900 F.2d 630, 637 (3d Cir. 1990).
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The Third Circuit rejected the defendant's contention that
the NLRA preempted the general admiralty law rules regarding maintenance and cure. 78 The court reached its conclusion
by determining the preemptive effect of a federal statute over
federal common law. 79 The court noted that if congressional
legislation speaks directly to the case law alleged to have been
preempted, the legislation then preempts the federal common
law." 0 The court held that none of the NLRA provisions cited
by the defendant spoke directly to the question of maintenance
and cure. 8 ' Therefore, the court held that the NLRA did not
preempt the admiralty obligation to pay maintenance and cure
to the unionized seaman. 8 2 The court stated that when Congress intends to preempt common law rights, it does so explicitly. 8 3 The court held that it would not do away with the right
78. Id. at 637-39. The defendant presented several provisions of the National
Labor Relations Act (the "NLRA") to support its argument for preemption. Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(d), 159(a) & 185(a) (1982)). The defendant contended that one
provision, which provides for an exclusive grievance and arbitration procedure, suggested that the collective bargaining agreement should control the proceedings.
Barnes, 900 F.2d at 638 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982)). The court pointed out that
according to the U.S. Supreme Court, the provision did not bind seamen to the grievance procedures required in the collective bargaining agreement. Id. Rather,
seamen could continue to use the traditional remedy of suing in federal court. Id.
Next, the defendant argued that the provision which establishes elected union
representatives as the exclusive bargaining agents for the seamen gave the union
agents the power to bargain away maintenance and cure if they thought it best.
Barnes, 900 F.2d at 638 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982)). The court dismissed that
interpretation by stating that the provision did not directly address the issue of
whether admiralty rights could be appropriately bargained for or bargained away. Id.
The defendant argued that a final provision, which requires unions and employers to bargain in good faith over employment terms, suggested that the collective
bargaining agreements reached by the union and the employer reflect a good faith
compromise. Barnes, 900 F.2d at 638 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982)). The court
held against this interpretation because the section did not directly speak to whether
admiralty rights were open to abrogation through the bargaining process. Id. at 63839; see U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 356 (1971) (noting that
NLRA did not preempt general admiralty rights of seamen).
79. Barnes, 900 F.2d at 637-38. The court used the U.S. Supreme Court's preemption test. Id.; see City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (setting forth
preemption test). The test requires a determination of whether the legislation directly addresses the point at issue, and whether applying the federal common law
would necessitate an overruling of the laws Congress specifically enacted. Id. at 31217.
80. Barnes, 900 F.2d at 637-38.
81. Id. at 639.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 638.
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to maintenance and cure until Congress expressly instructed it
to do so.8 4
Courts and commentators argue that unions no longer adequately represent the maintenance and cure interests of
seamen.8 5 The Barnes court suggested that by retaining a
US$8.00 per day rate of maintenance and cure, unions have
effectively abolished maintenance and cure for their members. 6 Other courts have expressed their displeasure with the
established figure of US$8.00 a day, claiming that it violated
the Supreme Court's directive against abrogating the seaman's
right to maintenance and cure.8 7 Arguably, employers and unions who bargain for US$8.00 per day are not truly bargaining
in good faith.8 8 Even some of the courts that adhere to the
"contractual obligation" interpretation have expressed hesitancy at enforcing the US$8.00 figure because it is inadequate 9
84. Id. at 640. The court explained its reasoning by stating that "unless Congress determines that the circumstances giving rise to the need for maintenance have
changed and that collective bargaining is now a more appropriate way to deal with
the issue of the ill or injured seaman, the common law remedy must remain in full
force." Id.
85. See infra notes 90-93 & 148-50 and accompanying text (discussing inadequate union representation).
86. Barnes v. Andover Co., 900 F.2d 630, 637 (3d Cir. 1990). The defendant
stated that setting the maintenance and cure rate at US$2.00 would constitute an
abrogation of the union contract. The Third Circuit disagreed, addressing the defendant's concept of abrogation by questioning the union's retention of "the 1952
rate of $8 a day when $8 a day in 1952 dollars would have a value of $32.24 in 1985."
Id.

87. See Incandela v. American Dredging Co., 659 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir. 1981);
Harper v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 563 F. Supp. 576, 582-84 (E.D. La. 1983); Rutherford v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1365, 1370 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
88. See Note, Punitive Damages For Maintenance And Cure: Is It How Much You Pay

Or How You Pay It-Harper v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 10 MAR. LAw. 103 (1985). The
student commentator poses the question of whether,
[w]ith current daily maintenance rates greatly in excess of $8.00, it is doubtful whether a court would accept an employer's alleged good faith belief
that $8 per day will suffice for food and lodging expenses of an injured seaman. Employers who currently pay an $8 daily rate of maintenance must be
aware of its ever increasing inadequacy and the possibility of punitive damages resulting from such payment.
Id. at 115.
89. See, e.g., Dixon v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 490 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D.N.Y.
1980), aff'd, 646 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 838 (1981). In Dixon,
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York upheld the US$8.00
rate because the Court of Appeals bound them. Id. at 1194. It explained that "[t]he
growing burden of inflation, the high cost of living and the diminished value of
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B. Maintenance and Cure as a "ContractualObligation"
Some courts adopt the view that maintenance and cure
can be a contractual provision.9" These courts note that unions represent seamen at the bargaining table.9 ' Courts,
therefore, must bind them to the contractual provisions to
which they have agreed.9 2 Beginning in 1980, an increasing
number of courts have bound unionized seamen to the rate of
maintenance and cure set in the union's collective bargaining
93
agreement.
money are factors about which we are not unsympathetic ... our Circuit Court has
fixed the daily rate for maintenance and cure at $8.00 and we feel so bound." Id.; see
Gajewski v. United States, 540 F. Supp. 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). In Gajewski, the court
seemed to indicate that, if the plaintiff-seaman had presented evidence regarding his
expenses, it would have granted his request for increased maintenance and cure. Id.
at 388. Judge Duffy stated:
I certainly appreciate in these inflationary times how difficult it is to support
one's self on eight dollars a day. However, absent any evidence upon which
to base an increased maintenance award, I am constrained to adhere to the
plaintiff's union contract and award eight dollars a day as the maximum
daily rate recoverable.
Id.; see Hodges v. Keystone Shipping Co., 578 F. Supp. 620 (S.D. Tex. 1983). In
Hodges, the court agreed that the higher rate was reasonable, but was bound by the
union agreement to enforce the US$8.00 rate. Id. at 622. The court noted that "the
rate of $30 per day [as awarded by the jury] is a reasonable amount, substantiated by
the record. However, the issue of the reasonableness of this amount is moot as plaintiff's rate of recovery of maintenance is limited by the [National Maritime Union]
contract." Id.
90. See, e.g., Macedo v. F/V Paul & Michelle, 868 F.2d 519, 522 (1st Cir. 1989).
91. See Grove v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 777, 780 (E.D. La. 1982). In
Grove the court emphasized the importance of union representation when it stated
that there could not "be asserted an argument of unequal bargaining position between the parties. On the contrary, there is every indication that the rate of maintenance in the collective barrgaining agreement was freely negotiated between the
Union, as representative of its members, and the employer." Id.
92. See id. at 887. The court stated that
if there exists a valid collective bargaining agreement between the seaman's
union and his employer, which expressly sets forth the rate of maintenance
to be paid a seaman employee should he become ill or injured, then the
Plaintiff, as a party to that agreement, will be bound by its terms.
Id.; Grove v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. La. 1982).
93. Dixon v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 490 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(binding seaman to collective bargaining agreement, regardless of inadequate rate of
maintenance and cure); see Gardiner v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 786 F.2d 943 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 924 (1986) (stating that when collectively bargained agreements
include maintenance and cure, it must be presumed that rate was set through negotiations which seamen agreed to, and therefore, agreement binds seamen); see also AlZawkari v. American S.S. Co., 871 F.2d 585 (6th Cir. 1989); Macedo v. F/V Paul &
Michelle, 868 F.2d 519 (1st Cir. 1989); Gaspard v. Taylor Diving & Salvage Co., Inc.,
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The seminal "contractual obligation" case is Gardiner v.
Sea-Land Service, Inc.a4 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in Gardiner was the first U.S. federal appellate
court to uphold the enforcement of a collectively bargained
rate of maintenance and cure regardless of its reasonableness
or adequacy.9 5 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 96 and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 7
have followed the Gardiner holding and enforced the contractual maintenance and cure rate.
In Gardiner, seven unionized seamen filed a declaratory
class action against a defendant class of admiralty employers. 9
The seamen asserted a right, under admiralty law, to maintenance and cure payments in excess of the US$8.00 per diem
rate set in their contracts.9 9 The defendant shipowners argued
for enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement by
claiming that the NLRA preempted traditional maintenance
and cure.' 00
The Gardiner court rejected the preemption argument because the NLRA did not specifically address admiralty law.' 0 '
The court, however, concluded that promoting the national labor policy of encouraging collective bargaining agreements
was a compelling reason toenforce the contract.1 0 2 The court
649 F.2d 372 (5th Cir. 1981); Castro v. M/V Ambassador, 657 F. Supp. 886 (E.D. La.
1987); Hodges v. Keystone Shipping Co., 578 F. Supp. 620 (S.D. Tex. 1983); Gajewski v. United States, 540 F. Supp. 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Grove v. Dixie Carriers, Inc.,
553 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. La. 1982); Dixon v. Maritime Overseas Corp., 646 F.2d 560
(2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 838 (1981).
94. 786 F.2d 943 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 924 (1986).
95. See id. at 947-50; see also Note, supra note 7, at 315 (stating that Gardinercourt
was first U.S. appellate court to rule whether inadequate maintenance and cure in
collectively bargained agreement would be enforced).
96. Macedo, 868 F.2d 519.

97. AI-Zawkari, 871 F.2d 585.
98. Gardiner, 786 F.2d at 945.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 947; see supra note 82 and accompanying text (setting forth NLRA
provisions argued by defendant). The Gardinercourt stated that the NLRA provisions
did not preempt traditional admiralty maintenance and cure, because they did not
specifically address maintenance and cure. Gardiner, 786 F.2d at 948. The congressional test for determining whether a federal law preempts a common law is whether
the federal law addresses that common law specifically. Id. at 947.
101. Gardiner, 786 F.2d at 949.
102. Id. at 948-49; see NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
In Allis-Chalmers,Justice Brennan explained that the "[niational labor policy has been
built on the premise that by pooling their economic strength and acting through a
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further stated that the employment contract resulted from vigorous debate and accommodation by both parties, and should
be viewed as a whole and enforced in its entirety.' 0 The court
reasoned that, because a great deal of compromising occurs
before the final contract is agreed upon, judicially discarding
one provision of that unified contract would threaten the viability of the entire contract. 0 4 The court stated that it was inappropriate to refuse to enforce certain provisions in collective
bargaining agreements while at the same time giving full force
to other provisions.10 5 Gardiner held that only if the collective
bargaining agreement as a whole was unfair could the court
disregard the agreement, including the maintenance and cure
06
provision.
The court held that it would not be fair to disregard the
collectively bargained agreement after the parties had already
negotiated its terms extensively." ° 7 The court stated that, if
the rate of maintenance is expressly included and set at
US$8.00, it is because the union negotiated that as part of the
entire contract. 0 8 Furthermore, the court stressed that maintenance and cure is not set randomly without regard to the rate
but rather as part of a package of benefits.' 0 9 Therefore, the
Gardiner court would bind seamen to the agreements unions
obtain unless there was proof that the entire contract was unlabor organization freely chosen by the majority, the employees of an appropriate
unit have the most effective means of bargaining for improvements in wages, hours,
and working conditions." Id. at 180.
103. Gardiner, 786 F.2d at 949.
104. Id.
105. Id. The court indicated the importance of considering the collective bargaining agreement as a whole by stating that "[w]e cannot fairly say that this rate
[maintenance and cure], as a consequence of the normal 'give and take' process of
collective bargaining, is not entitled to the same reliability accorded to other terms
and conditions within the same agreement." Id.; see Grove v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 553
F. Supp. 777, 780 (E.D. La. 1982) (supporting premise that "give and take" ensures
fair contracts).
106. Gardiner v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 786 F.2d 943, 949 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 924 (1986).
107. Id.
108. Id. The court indicated the importance of viewing the contract as a unified
whole when it noted that the "rate of maintenance is but one of many elements contained within the Union contract and over which the parties negotiate, and there may
be a considerable amount of 'give and take' exercised by the parties in coming to a
final agreement on all of the elements." Id. (citing Grove v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 553
F. Supp. 777, 780 (E.D. La. 1982)).
109. Id. at 949.
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fair."10

The proponents of the "contractual obligation" theory
state that the duty to provide maintenance and cure cannot be
abrogated entirely but it can be modified by the contract."I
Some proponents contend that a low maintenance and cure
rate does not signify that maintenance and cure has been abrogated by the parties because the rate has been set, presumably,

after good faith bargaining.'

12

"Contractual obligation" proponents disagree with the

ancient doctrine treating seamen as "wards of admiralty" in
need of the courts' protection." 3 They point to improved living conditions on board vessels since the 1800s to support
their position. 4 Additionally, commentators suggest that the
benefits obtained for seamen, such as union disability plans
and pensions, actually provide the injured seaman with more
benefits than the collectively
bargained rate of maintenance
5
and cure would indicate."
The "contractual obligation" proponents agree that un-

ions play a paramount role in the protection of seamen."

6

110. Id. The court opined that "the nature of the 'give and. take' process of
collective bargaining suggest [sic] that acceptance of a particular package of benefits
should be binding on the union members." Id.
111. See Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc., 287 U.S. 367, 371 (1932) (stating
that maintenance and cure could not be abolished by any agreement or contract); see
also AI-Zawkari v. American S.S. Co., 871 F.2d 585, 588 (6th Cir. 1989) (stating that
duty to provide maintenance and cure cannot be entirely abrogated because it is an
implied contractual provision).
112. Barnes v. Andover Co., L.P., 900 F.2d 630, 645 (3d Cir. 1990) (Lifland,J.,
dissenting).
113. See Gardiner v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 786 F.2d 943, 948 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 924 (1986); Note, supra note 23, at 633 & 639.
114. Note, supra note 23, at 633 (noting improvement in seamen's conditions
include upgrading living conditions aboard vessels and unionization). But see Whittemore, Toward Maritime Strength, N.Y. Times, May 1, 1981, at A31, col. 2 (stating "high
losses at sea of both men and ships, largely a result of human error, standards of
education, training, and management of seafaring and on-shore maritime personnel
should be examined").
115. See, e.g., Flaherty, supra note 5, at 541 (listing sick leave, disability plans, and
pensions as some benefits unions obtain in exchange for low per diem rate of maintenance and cure); see also Note, supra note 23, at 639 (proposing that unions now act as
seamen's "friends" by protecting their interests through collective bargaining agreement and courts should enforce collectively bargained agreements because resulting
contracts include benefits which meet best interests of seamen).
116. See, e.g., Gardiner, 786 F.2d at 948 (pointing to national labor policy for encouraging collective bargaining which asserts that seamen are better represented in
unions).
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The national labor policy of encouraging collectively bargained agreements is based on the combined economic
strength of union members." 7 The union provides the most
effective method of negotiating for improvements because of
its large membership." 8 Courts supporting the "contractual
obligation" view reason that seamen, by combining their
strength into one union, are effectively represented in negotiations with the shipowner." 19
III. MAINTENANCE AND CURE IS AN ADMIRALTY RIGHT
The core of dissent over maintenance and cure lies in
whether to apply the remedy as an "admiralty right" or as a
"contractual obligation."' 120 Traditional and modern admiralty theories prove, however, that maintenance and cure is a
The courts should, theregeneral admiralty law remedy.'
fore, enforce the "admiralty right" interpretation of maintenance and cure.
A. Maintenance and Cure is Based on GeneralAdmiralty Law, Not
on Contract Principles
Maintenance and cure cannot be abrogated or contracted
away and, therefore, should be removed from the bargaining
process altogether. 2 2 Courts adopting the "contractual obligation" approach base most of their rationale on the fact that
seamen elect their union representatives to bargain for
them.' 23 These courts state that because seamen are represented at the bargaining table, they forfeit their right to dis117. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967); see also
Note, supra note 7, at 316 (explaining that unions bargain most effectively for seamen
because they represent combined economic strength of members).
118. See Note, supra note 7, at 316.
119. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (defining national labor policy).
120. See generally Note, supra note 7, at 316 (discussing how rise of unions began
dispute over whether to consider maintenance and cure "maritime right" or "contractual obligation"). For a discussion of both viewpoints, see supra notes 54 & 55
and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 27-35 & 60-65 and accompanying text (discussing traditional and modern maritime theories).
122. See generally Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, Inc. 287 U.S. 367, 371-72
(1932).
123. See, e.g., Gardiner v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 786 F.2d 943, 949 (9th Cir.) (noting that bartering nature of collective bargaining negotiations indicate that resulting
contracts should be enforced), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 924 (1986).
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pute the final agreement. 2' These courts, however, mistakenly assume that maintenance and cure is an appropriate subject for negotiation. As an admiralty right, maintenance and
cure inexorably attaches to each seaman's employment contract regardless of the parties' intentions. 25 Maintenance and
cure is an ancient right, implicit in the very fact of maritime
employment.126 Contractual negotiations cannot abrogate or
modify it, and it is therefore inappropriate to include mainte12 7
nance and cure in a collectively bargained agreement.
"Contractual obligation" proponents also argue that setting aside a collectively bargained provision would discourage
collective bargaining agreements.' 2 Although maintenance
and cure has been included in maritime employment contracts,
severance would not harm national labor policy because maintenance and cure, as an admiralty right and not a contractual
right, is not a proper subject for negotiation. 29 Removal of
maintenance and cure from the scope of bargaining would
eliminate various courts' dilemmas whether to disregard a collectively bargained-for provision. It would thus strengthen the
collective bargaining process and national labor policy. Moreover, national labor policy does not specifically apply to admiralty issues.' 30 It is therefore inconsistent to ignore a general
admiralty law right of a seaman in order to protect an arguably
124. See, e.g., id. at 949-50.
125. See supra notes 55 & 61-66 and accompanying text (detailing how right is
implicit in fact of employment).
126. See supra notes 55 & 61-66 and accompanying text (noting that maintenance
and cure is ancient right implicit in employment).
127. See Brown v. Lull, 4 F. Cas. 407 (C.C.D. Mass. 1836) (No. 2,018). Justice
Story set forth one of the most powerful explanations of why maintenance and cure
cannot be included in contractual negotiations. Id. at 409. He stated that
"[w]henever, therefore, any stipulation is found in the shipping articles, which derogates from the general rights and privileges of seamen, courts of admiralty hold it
void, as founded upon imposition or an undue advantage taken of their necessities
and ignorance, and improvidence." Id.
128. See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text (discussing why "contractual
obligation" proponents think that collective bargaining agreements would suffer if
not enforced in their entirety).
129. But see Barnes v. Andover Co., L.P., 900 F.2d 630, 640 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that maintenance and cure can be part of negotiations as long as final rate is
realistic and adequate); Rutherford v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1365, 1373
(N.D. Cal. 1983) (stating that collective bargaining agreement can include maintenance and cure but that shipowners cannot enforce provision if it is inadequate).
130. Barnes, 900 F.2d at 639.
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irrelevant national labor policy.'I'
Courts espousing the "contractual obligation" approach
emphasize union representation of seamen. 3 2 Unions, however, do not adequately represent the needs of seamen. 3 3 The
sheer volume of cases that allege insufficient maintenance and
cure indicates the lack of adequate representation. 34 The
scarcity of jobs for seamen suggests that unions may be more
willing to accept unfair bargains, including a low rate of main3 5
tenance and cure, in order to obtain jobs for their members.
Moreover, unions may agree to a lower daily rate of maintenance and cure in exchange for items such as sick leave and
union disability pensions.' 36 Unions have used maintenance
and cure as a bargaining chip, and have constructively given it
away even though some seamen depend upon maintenance
37

and cure to finance their recovery from their illnesses.

B. Courts Should Enforce the TraditionalView of Maintenance and
Cure as an Admiralty Right
The doctrine of maintenance and cure originated in the
ancient sea codes.' 3 ' In the United States, the doctrine even131. Id. at 640.
132. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (listing courts adhering to "contractual obligation" view).

133. See supra notes 90-92 & infra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing
inadequate representation provided by unions).
134. At least thirty-seven U.S. cases address insufficient maintenance and cure.
See, e.g., Barnes v. Andover Co., 900 F.2d 630 (3d Cir. 1990).
135. See generally Ruben, Collective Bargaining and Labor-Management Relations, 112
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 25 (1989) (noting unions' struggles against lack ofjobs available

to union members due to competition from non-union workers).
136. Flaherty, supra note 5, at 541. These tactics may have been appropriate
prior to 1981, when the U.S. Public Health Service Hospitals were still open and gave
free medical care to seamen, allowing the sailor to use all of his daily US$8.00 maintenance and cure award on maintenance. Id. In 1981, however, the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act terminated seamen's rights to free health care by closing the U.S.
Public Health Service Hospitals. 42 U.S.C. § 248(b) (1988).
137. See, e.g., Gardiner v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 786 F.2d 943, 950 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 924 (1986). The court demonstrated that the union knew of its members' need for increased maintenance and cure, yet the union bargained it away. Id.
at 949. The court explained that "[i]n 1975 the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association requested an increase in the maintenance rate to $20.00 and in 1981 the Seafarers International Union asked for an increase to $12.00. Both proposals were withdrawn as part of the give and take of collective bargaining." Id.
138. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (discussing' how ancient sea codes
formed basis for considering maintenance and cure an admiralty right).
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tually gained support through the Supreme Court's classification of maintenance and cure as an admiralty right.

39

As an

admiralty right, it was not subject to abrogation by any agreement or contract. 40 U.S. courts should continue to award
maintenance and cure on the basis of actual cost to seamen
because that is the traditional method of award.' 4 ' Moreover,
an actual cost award takes inflation into account 42 and
removes the award from the reach of unions that are increasingly unable to strike a fair bargain on behalf of their members
due to their diminishing power.'

43

Traditionally, courts viewed maintenance and cure as an
absolute right' 4 4 that had to fulfill seamen's actual needs.' 45
The ancient codes and U.S. case law both provided that injured seamen receive maintenance and cure comparable to
what was provided on board the vessel. 146 This interpretation
of the right provided seamen with the actual out-of-pocket ex47
penses. 1

The current disagreement in the courts over which doctrine to enforce unfairly penalizes unionized seamen. When
the unions became powerful in the 1940s, they included maintenance and cure in the contract negotiations and set the main139. See De Zon v. American President Lines, Ltd., 318 U.S. 660, 667 (1943)
(stating that duty to provide maintenance and cure arose once seaman entered service of ship and no private agreement could abrogate that duty).
140. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (noting that U.S. courts consistently held maintenance and cure as implied in employment contract, regardless of
contracts stating otherwise, and therefore could not be ignored).
141. See Rutherford v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1365, 1369-70 (N.D.
Cal. 1983).
142. Id.
143. See Sawyer, Mutinous Band Bids to Clear Decks of Maritime Union Leaders, Wash.
Post, Mar. 20, 1983, at A2 (describing mismanagement and lack of adequate representation by union leaders of National Maritime Union for union's dwindling membership).
144. See Rutherford, 575 F. Supp. at 1369.
145. See id The court noted that maintenance and cure should be equivalent to
seamen's actual costs and stated that "[e]vidence of the seaman's actual expenditures
is the preferred method of determining the amount of the daily maintenance payment owed to the seaman." Id. (citation omitted).
146. See Laws of Olron, supra note 1, art. VII, at 1174-75 (requiting shipowner
to provide food and lodging equivalent to shipboard conditions); see also Aguilar v.
Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 729 (1943); Barnes v. Andover Co., L.P., 900 F.2d
630, 634 (3d Cir. 1990); The Bouker No. 2, 241 F. 831, 835 (2d Cir. 1917).
147. Gardiner v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 786 F.2d 943, 946 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 924 (1986).
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tenance and cure rate at US$8.00 per day, which was reasonable at that time. t 48 Unions have since kept the rate at
US$8.00 per day.' 49 This rate is no longer adequate because
inflation has caused the cost of food and lodging on land to
reach a level which seamen cannot afford with the contractual
rate of maintenance and cure.'5 ° Recently, non-unionized
seamen have received increased maintenance and cure awards
because the courts concluded that US$8.00 a day was "starvation payment"'15 1 and the expectation that lodging and meals
could be found for that price was "unrealistic, if not pure fantasy."' 1 52 A unionized seaman cannot live on US$8.00 any easier than a non-unionized seaman can. It seems unfair, therefore, to subject the unionized seaman to that rate of maintenance and cure. Furthermore, it is ironic that unionized
seamen, who as union members should receive more protec148. See BENEDICT, supra note 62, § 51, at 4-74; G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra
note 7, § 6-12, at 307 (both discussing setting of US$8.00 rate of maintenance and
cure).

149. Barnes v. Andover Co., 900 F.2d 630, 635 (3d Cir. 1990).
150. See Rutherford v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1365, 1370 (N.D. Cal.
1983) (stating that "it is now generally recognized that $8.00 per day is no longer a
sufficient sum for a seaman to secure lodging and three meals."); see also BENEDICT,
supra note 62, at § 51, at 4-74. Benedict stated that
[d]espite the recent rapid rate of inflation the standard amount of maintenance recovery has not been increased since the 1950's. Today, practically
no one is capable of maintaining himself at the $8.00 per day, especially
ashore. If maintenance is to retain the same definition that it had many
years ago, this rate is obviously unrealistic; even the most penurious seaman
would probably be unable to maintain himself ashore today on a palty [sic]
$8.00 per day.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see Note, supra note 92, at 116 (noting that "$8.00 daily rate
of maintenance is woefully inadequate").
151. Harper v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 563 F. Supp. 576, 582 (E.D. La. 1983);
accord Morel v. Sabine Towing & Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1982) (awarding
sailor US$20 per day in Port Arthur, Texas); Incandela v. American Dredging Co.,
659 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1981) (awarding US$26.80 per day in New York City); see, e.g.,
Castro v. M/V Ambassador, 657 F. Supp. 886, 887 (E.D. La. 1987) (illustrating that
courts have not ignored unique problem of non-union seamen). When dealing with
non-union seamen even the courts which favor a contractual interpretation agree that
non-union seamen should not be held to a contract which they were not party to in
the bargaining sessions. Id. In Castro, the court noted that it had
previously held that in the absence of a union contract expressly providing
for a specific rate of maintenance, the amount of maintenance to which an ill
or injured seaman is entitled is a question of fact to be determined by the
trial court based upon the evidence presented.
Id.
152. Rutherford, 575 F. Supp. at 1370.
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tion against inadequate compensation than non-unionized
seamen, are in actuality at a disadvantage during maintenance
and cure litigation.
Today, it would be unreasonable to expect any seaman to
survive on a maintenance and cure award of US$8.00 per
day. "53
' Statistics indicate that inflation has caused U.S. prices
to increase by 500% since World War II, when the rate of
US$8.00 was set.154 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Louisiana calculated the effect of inflation on prices
and determined that US$8.00 per day for maintenance and
cure in 1945 was the rough equivalent of US$40.00 a day in
Louisiana in 1983.'- 5

Many courts that have heard cases for

maintenance and cure in the past decade have concluded that
US$8.00 a day5 6 is a sorely inadequate amount of money on
which to live.'

Opponents of the "admiralty right" position might argue
that awarding seamen their actual expenditures for maintenance and cure would necessitate a complex case-by-case review to determine those actual expenditures. As far back as
1938, however, the U.S. Supreme Court said that a seaman's
recovery must be measured on a case-by-case basis by the reasonable cost of the maintenance and cure to which the seaman
is entitled at the time of trial, including such amounts as may
be needful in the immediate future. 157 Case-by-case review,
with the purpose of awarding seamen their actual costs, would
153. See infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text (explaining how insufficient
US$8.00 per day is for seamen); see also G. GILMORE AND C. BLACK, supra note 7, § 612, at 307. The commentators stated that
[t]he failure to adjust the rate to reflect inflation suggests that maintenance
is no longer regarded as a living allowance sufficient to support even the
proverbially impecunious unmarried male seaman in the modest circumstances to which he is thought to be entitled.
Id.; see BENEDICT, supra note 62.
154. Harper v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 563 F. Supp. 576, 584 n.4 (E.D. La. 1983).
155. Id.
156. See supra notes 153-55 (demonstrating that US$8.00 is inadequate). The
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Cuny v. Fluor Drilling Services, Inc., handled the question with a more conservative, though more permanent, response.
Curry v. Fluor Drilling Servs., 715 F.2d 893, 896 (5th Cir. 1983). The majority declined to award the seaman the increased rate because he failed to offer any evidence
of his expenditures. Id. Judge Tate, in his dissent, stated that the Western District of
Louisiana has a jurisprudential rule which presumes fifteen dollars per day to be an
equitable rate of maintenance, in the absence of proof indicating otherwise. Id.
157. Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 531 (1938). Moreover, in 1983,
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actually reduce the amount of maintenance and cure litigation
because shipowners would realize that they must pay the actual
costs and thus they would rarely contest the requested rate. If
a case did reach the courts, a court could inquire into four factors to determine maintenance and cure: the seaman's actual
costs, expert testimony on the cost of food and lodging in the
area, the maintenance rates given in the local union contracts,
58
and previous court awards.'
Opponents might argue further that an actual cost method
would provide seamen the opportunity to defraud their shipowner and would be significantly more expensive than a per
diem rate. Seamen could not take advantage of the shipowner
by requesting exorbitant rates, however, because the shipowner usually knows the on-shore cost of living.' 59 The shipowner's alternative to paying actual costs would be to contract
for an inadequate rate of maintenance and cure, thereby opening himself to lawsuits, expensive attorney's fees, and the subjective opinion of ajury, which might award more than the seaman's actual costs.
Many seamen, unionized and non-unionized, bring suit
the Rutherford court stated that courts have used the case-by-case method for many
years, so continuing that practice would not be burdensome:
This case-by-case litigation was the practice of the courts before the advent
of collective bargaining agreements that set maintenance rates. A continuation of that practice is no burden on the courts, especially as the seamen are
the wards of the courts. Further, lack of certainty or inconvenience are not
reasons to abrogate the seaman's important right to maintenance.
Rutherford v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1365, 1371 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
158. Rutherford, 575 F. Supp. at 1369. The court stated that, historically, the
preferred method of determining the new maintenance rate was by receiving evidence of the seaman's actual expenditures. Id.; see M. NORRIS, supra note 16, at
§ 26:70. This commentator suggested that
[i]t is the duty of the courts, under the general maritime law ... to award
maintenance in favor of the seaman and the rate thereof. While the rate of
maintenance as agreed by the seamens' [sic] unions and the shipowners may
be considered by the courts when determining the proper amount, nevertheless such agreements should not be followed if they lead to an unjust,
inequitable, unreasonable and unrealistic result and thus harmful to the seaman.
Id. at 174-75.
159. Note, supra note 22, at 637-38. The student commentator states that
"[e]mployers also know what it costs the [seamen] to live ashore when the facilities of
the vessel are denied them. These companies will avoid paying for something from
which they receive no return, and the seamen will avoid a per diem which does not
reimburse their expenses." Id.
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for increased maintenance and cure because the contractual
rates set by the unions are ineffective. Until seamen receive
maintenance and cure equivalent to their actual costs, the litigation will continue.
CONCLUSION
Maintenance and cure is recognized as an ancient admiralty right implicit in contracts of marine employment. This
right originated in the belief that the vessel served as the, seaman's home and the seaman should not be deprived of that
shelter once an illness begins. When a seaman was forced to
seek lodging and medical attention on land, the shipowner had
to provide the injured seaman with room and board comparable to that provided on the vessel. That standard of awarding
maintenance and cure, in effect, resulted in providing the seaman with the actual costs incurred. The method of awarding
actual costs incurred should continue because it alone adequately meets the maintenance and cure needs of seamen.
Virginia A. McDaniel *
* J.D. Candidate, 1992, Fordham University.

